Friday, August 26, 2011


As a forensic scientist, I am frequently hired by attorneys in both criminal and civil cases to examine and reconstruct events that involve violent crime. Typically they are cases relating to shootings, strangulations, sexual assault, homicide, and combinations of these – especially in my capital (aka death penalty) work. As Jerry Chisum and I explain in the newly published second edition our text with the same name, Crime Reconstruction is the determination of the actions and events surrounding the commission of a crime. It can be accomplished by using the statements of witnesses, the confessions of a suspects, the statements of living victims, or by examining and interpreting physical evidence (Chisum & Turvey, 2011).
Admissibility v. Reliability
Historically, law enforcement efforts have involved less focus on physical evidence (for lack of training and understanding) and more focus on developing witness or confession evidence. This is because witness statements and confession evidence are equally admissible, while easier to understand, when compared to physical evidence.
In other words, law enforcement relies on witnesses and confessions because they can; because they do not generally need it for court when they have a person that they are able to get some version of events from. This means relying on traumatized victims, emotional family members, and even making deals with co-conspirators and jailhouse informants in exchange for testimony. It also means, for less experienced investigators, pressing suspect interviews until they get what can be characterized as an inculpatory statement that can be re-characterized as a confession – whether it is or not.
The net effect of this practice is that all witness and suspect statements are treated as sufficiently reliable evidence, and taken at face value, by law enforcement investigators because of courtroom acceptance. Admissibility, in this view, equates to reliability.
As a consequence, this is why some (not all) law enforcement investigators are willing to go further and accept unsubstantiated statements as reliable – simply because they are admissible as evidence in court. They may even go so far as to fail to investigate beyond a statement for fear of uncovering contradictions.
Regardless of acceptance by some law enforcement investigators (the same people who will rely on things that the court has actually deemed inadmissible, such as polygraphs, voice stress analysis, and even psychics), evidence reliability may not be automatically assumed in the world of forensic science.

Passing the Reliability Test
As explained previously (“Devil’s Deal: (Mis)Understanding the Alford Pleas from the ‘West Memphis 3’”) - it is important to understand that scientific fact and legal truths are not the same thing, governed by very different rules and realities (Thornton and Peterson, 2002). Scientific fact refers to information and events that have been established based on a broad factual record to a reasonable degree of objective scientific certainty by scientists using the scientific method. Legal truth refers to information and events that have been established by a court ruling based on a narrow factual record—at the discretion of a judge and/or jury (Turvey et al, 2010). This is why factually innocent people can get convicted of crimes they did not commit, and the factually guilty can avoid being convicted, depending on what is presented in courtroom and how it is perceived.
In some instances the court will want the forensic scientist to forget their science and its mandates in exchange for admissibility. They will want the forensic scientist to subordinate themselves to scientifically untenable legal rulings. We should be loath to do this, and have a responsibility make a clear record of when it is happening with our testimony or the testimony of others.
Forensic scientists must therefore not accept statements as fact simply because the police or the courts have accepted them as evidence. They must in fact apply a reliability test to any evidence that is incorporated into a reconstruction of events; otherwise, what they are doing is not scientific in practice. As explained in Chisum & Turvey (2011), in the chapter on practice standards for the reconstruction of crime, #3 provides (p.106): “Reconstructionists are responsible for determining whether the evidence they are examining is of sufficient quality to provide the basis for a reconstruction.” The best way to test the reliability of statement evidence (e.g., witness statements, confessions) is to compare it with the available physical evidence. If it comports with all of the known physical evidence and/ or is not refuted by it, then a degree of reliability has been achieved.
An uncorroborated or uninvestigated statement from any witnesses or suspect is, in general, insufficiently reliable for use in a scientific reconstruction. Statements only become reliable upon investigation and corroboration with the facts and evidence, such as when they align with the physical evidence or contain details that only the offender or someone who witnessed the crime could know. This is something that professional investigators understand from years of being burned by liars and DNA (see Savino and Turvey, 2011). Only the lazy and inexperienced, lacking good leadership, ignore these realities.
Examples of statement evidence that should scream for further investigation and demand corroboration include, but are certainly not limited to, those from:
  1. Jailhouse informants;
  2. Multiple jailhouse informants;
  3. Co-conspirators and co-defendants;
  4. Criminals (e.g., criminal competitors, drug dealers, prostitutes, and drug addicts);
  5. The mentally infirm (e.g., mentally ill, under the influence of alcohol or other drugs);
  6. Those with ulterior motives against suspects; and
  7. Those with any criminal culpability in the crime at hand.
It is bad enough for an uncorroborated statement to make it into evidence, signaling an utter lack of investigation. But when uncorroborated statements come from someone that is inherently unreliable, or who is duplicitous for a living, then the failure to investigate and corroborate is all that more egregious. The lack of an investigation into such statements may even suggest the intentional concealment of potentially contrary evidence – and in any case demands both doubt and review (note: special thanks to my other co-author/colleague Det. John Savino, NYPD [ret.] for his help brainstorming the language and list in this section) .

Courts Catching Up with Science
In the past, I have placed the following language or something similar in my forensic reports when necessary: “Given that this witness does not appear to have been investigated for prior grievances with the defendant to rule out criminal culpability and ulterior motives, and that there is no corroborating physical evidence to support their statements, the reliability of their statements is unknown. As such they form an insufficient basis for any reliable forensic conclusions regarding the nature or sequence of events.” This to provide a scientific explanation for refusing to accept, at face value, statements from unreliable or uninvestigated witnesses.
In other cases, false statements from witnesses (or alleged victims) must be highlighted in a forensic report when their version conflicts with the evidence – and the court is expecting everyone to rely upon this conflicted version as fact.
For example, in a recent shooting case that I worked out of Mississippi (MS v. Shelton Myers; pictured), two victims were shot. They were husband and wife. The husband died at the scene, and the wife claims she was both shot and witnessed other events that she recounted in her testimony before the jury. In my reconstruction report, I noted that she had admitted to bringing a Lorcin .25 caliber pistol to the crime scene; that she had dropped it immediately upon finding the mortally wounded body of her husband in the street; and that it had possibly gone off once or twice. I also noted that police investigators recovered (4) .25 cal. shell casings from near the body of her husband, indicating that it had been fired at least four times from at or near that location. Even the crime scene investigator in the case was forced to acknowledge that she must have been lying in her testimony – that guns don’t really go off like that when they are dropped, and definitely not four times. This lie caused every other “fact” in her testimony to be doubted, and ultimately caused the jury to acquit the defendant of murder (Doherty, 2011). And rightfully so. However this lie would not have been identified had the case not been reconstructed, and had the defense not scrupulously questioned the police investigators about the possibility of a dropped gun resulting in four shots. This is something that could (should?) have been identified by police investigators, and the prosecution, much earlier, but wasn’t.
The point being that there are times when statement evidence cannot be accepted uncritically, and especially by forensic scientists, due to a lack of reliability. And the courts are finally catching up with this reality.
In New Jersey, the State Supreme Court acknowledged the general lack of reliability in eyewitness identification, and changed the rules about how such evidence may be admitted in a profound way. As explained in Weiser (2011):
The New Jersey Supreme Court, acknowledging a “troubling lack of reliability in eyewitness identifications,” issued sweeping new rules on Wednesday making it easier for defendants to challenge such evidence in criminal cases.
The court said that whenever a defendant presents evidence that a witness’s identification of a suspect was influenced, by the police, for instance, a judge must hold a hearing to consider a broad range of issues. These could include police behavior, but also factors like lighting, the time that had elapsed since the crime or whether the victim felt stress at the time of the identification.
When such disputed evidence is admitted, the court said, the judge must give detailed explanations to jurors, even in the middle of a trial, on influences that could heighten the risk of misidentification. In the past, judges held hearings on such matters, but they were far more limited.
The decision applies only in New Jersey, but is likely to have considerable impact nationally. The state’s highest court has long been considered a trailblazer in criminal law, and New Jersey has already been a leader in establishing guidelines on how judges should handle such testimony.
For the complete ruling, see: New Jersey v. Larry R. Henderson (Supreme Court ff New Jersey A-8-08, September Term 2008). See also: “NJ Judge Calls for Overhaul of Eyewitness Identification Standards,” andN.J. courts need stricter standards for eyewitness testimony, report says.” The need for expert testimony on this issue, and for reconstructions that help corroborate or refute unreliable witness testimony, has never been so clear.
In California, a law has recently been passed (SB 687) to help ensure that no judge or jury convicts a defendant based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of a jailhouse informant. This law will, in effect, require criminal investigation that considers physical evidence as well as statement testimony, in cases where there is no direct witness to the crime. See: “Legislation Seeking to Curtail Wrongful Convictions Passes Assembly” and “Law requires corroboration of cellmate's testimony.” At least 17 other states already have similar laws.
Soon, the Supreme Court of the United States (aka SCOTUS) will revisit the question of the proper admissibility of eyewitness identifications. As explained in Liptak (2011):
Every year, more than 75,000 eyewitnesses identify suspects in criminal investigations. Those identifications are wrong about a third of the time, a pile of studies suggest.
Mistaken identifications lead to wrongful convictions. Of the first 250 DNA exonerations, 190 involved eyewitnesses who were wrong, as documented in “Convicting the Innocent,” a recent book by Brandon L. Garrett, a law professor at the University of Virginia.
Many of those witnesses were as certain as they were wrong. “There is absolutely no question in my mind,” said one. Another was “120 percent” sure. A third said, “That is one face I will never forget.” A fourth allowed for a glimmer of doubt: “This is the man, or it is his twin brother.”
In November, the Supreme Court will return to the question of what the Constitution has to say about the use of eyewitness evidence. The last time the court took a hard look at the question was in 1977. Since then, the scientific understanding of human memory has been transformed.
Indeed, there is no area in which social science research has done more to illuminate a legal issue. More than 2,000 studies on the topic have been published in professional journals in the past 30 years. What they collectively show is that it is perilous to base a conviction on a witness’s identification of a stranger. Memory is not a videotape. It is fragile at best, worse under stress and subject to distortion and contamination.
The unreliability of eyewitness identification is matched by its power.
The case under review is Perry v. New Hampshire, No, 10-8974. The aforementioned decision in New Jersey v. Larry R. Henderson is going to play no small part in educating the Justices regarding the current state of the literature on the fallibility of human memory and subsequent IDs.
All of this only serves to strengthen that which I was taught in the very first forensic science course that I ever attended. Regarding the reliability of physical evidence over everything else, as explained many years ago by Dr. Paul Leland Kirk (pictured), the father of modern forensic science: “This is evidence that does not forget. It is not confused by the excitement of the moment. It is not absent because human witnesses are. It is factual evidence. Physical evidence cannot be wrong; it cannot perjure itself; it cannot be wholly absent. Only its interpretation can err,” (Kirk, 1953; p. 4).

Chisum, W.J. and Turvey, B. (2011) Crime Reconstruction, 2nd Ed., San Diego: Elsevier Science.
Doherty, T. (2011) “Man found not guilty in Slaying case,” The Clarion Ledger, March 19.
Elko, B. (2011) “Law requires corroboration of cellmate's testimony,” San Francisco Chronicle, August 3; p.C2.
Kirk, P. (1953) Crime Investigation, New York: Interscience.
Liptak, A. (2011) “34 Years Later, Supreme Court Will Revisit Eyewitness IDs,” New York Times, August 22.
Savino, J. and Turvey, B. (2011) Rape Investigation Handbook, 2nd Ed., San Diego: Elsevier Science.
Thornton, J. and Peterson, J. (2002) “The General Assumptions and Rationale of Forensic Identification,” In: Faigman, D. L., Kaye, D. H., Saks, M. J. and Sanders, J. (Eds.) Modern Scientific Evidence: The Law and Science of Expert Testimony, vol. 3, St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co.
Turvey, B., Ferguson, C. and Petherick, W. (2010) Forensic Criminology, San Diego: Elsevier Science.
Weiser, B. (2011) “In New Jersey, Rules Are Changed on Witness IDs,” New York Times, August 24.

Friday, March 11, 2011

Kansas Bill Allows Forensic Scientists to Avoid Proper Qualification and Subvert Due Process

This week, legislators in the State of Kansas passed a bill that would allow crime lab reports to be entered into evidence during court proceedings without need of courtroom testimony from those who wrote them (reported in Lefler, 2011). Kansas House Bill No. 2057, by the Committee on Corrections and Juvenile Justice, provides forensic scientists working for the state with not only a blanket presumption of credibility and expertise, it also sets in place a barrier to proper expert qualification.

There are several problems with this. First, it violates the defendant's Constitutional right to due process. Second, it ignores the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Melendez-Diaz regarding the defendant's right to confront their accuser, requiring that forensic scientists be present when their report's are entered into evidence. Third, it provides a presumption of credibility of expertise that allows crime labs to shield inept or fraudulent examinations and examiners. And finally, it leaves the interpretation of forensic reports up to the one introducing it - likely a prosecutor. Let's consider each of these briefly.

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." As discussed in Turvey and Petherick (2010), due process is essentially a fairness requirement. Any condition or treatment that tends to bias a judge, jury, or the process as a whole in favor of the state is considered in violation of due process. Ideally, citizens may only be tried and punished for crimes alleged by the state under the most impartial and unprejudiced conditions. Common examples include things like inadequate or incompetent defense counsel, access to legal counsel or private forensic experts, and failure to disclose exculpatory evidence or witnesses. In reality, the government has more money, more resources to draw from, and often benefits from a presumption of guilt held by ignorant and even partial jurors. Even under the best of conditions, due process is an ideal rather than a reality.

To abide the mandates of due process, scientists employed by the government must conduct forensic examinations in such a way as to be transparent in their methods and findings. As explained by the National Academy of Sciences (Edwards and Gotsonis, 2009; pp. 6–3):

"As a general matter, laboratory reports generated as the result of a scientific analysis should be complete and thorough. They should describe, at a minimum, methods and materials, procedures, results, and conclusions, and they should identify, as appropriate, the sources of uncertainty in the procedures and conclusions along with estimates of their scale (to indicate the level of confidence in the results).

Although it is not appropriate and practicable to provide as much detail as might be expected in a research paper, sufficient content should be provided to allow the nonscientist reader to understand what has been done and permit informed, unbiased scrutiny of the conclusion.

Some forensic laboratory reports meet this standard of reporting, but most do not. Some reports contain only identifying and agency information, a brief description of the evidence being submitted, a brief description of the types of analysis requested, and a short statement of the results (e.g., “The green, brown plant material in item #1 was identified as marijuana”). The norm is to have no description of the methods or procedures used, and most reports do not discuss measurement uncertainties or confidence limits. Many disciplines outside the forensic science disciplines have standards, templates, and protocols for data reporting. Although some of the Scientific Working Groups have a scoring system for reporting findings, they are not uniformly or consistently used.

Forensic science reports, and any courtroom testimony stemming from them, must include clear characterizations of the limitations of the analyses, including associated probabilities where possible. Courtroom testimony should be given in lay terms so that all trial participants can understand how to weight and interpret the testimony. In order to enable this, research must be undertaken to evaluate the reliability of the steps of the various identification methods and the confidence intervals associated with the overall conclusions."

In other words, notes and reports must be discovered to the defense in a timely fashion prior to trial. Scientists must willingly make themselves available to the defense for pretrial interviews about their methods and findings. They must not withhold, conceal, or distort their methods and findings—especially if their findings tend to exculpate or exonerate the defendant. And generally they must treat the prosecution and the defense equally—even if the police department or prosecutor’s office signs their paycheck.

But, as determined in the investigation of forensic science conducted by the National Academy of Science quoted above, most forensic science reports don't accomplish this. Consequently, the only way for due process to even have the chance of prevailing is for the forensic scientist to show up in court with their report in order to explain what's missing from it, and what it means. Science, it must be understood, cannot be taken at face value. It's reliability is found only in the details regarding procedures and methodology that are regularly omitted from such reports.


In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, the United States Supreme Court held that "Under Crawford, a witness’s testimony against a defendant is inadmissible unless the witness appears at trial or, if the witness is unavailable, the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination." It further held that forensic scientists, and their evidence examination reports, are not exempt from this requirement. If a forensic science report is to be admitted, it must be accompanied in court by the actual forensic scientist who wrote it so that they might be questioned as to issues regarding its origins and reliability. They cannot simply send a crime lab report to be accepted and believed without a real live person there to vouch for what's written in it.


One of the necessary safeguards for incompetent or inexpert testimony is expert voir dire. Before a forensic expert may give testimony in court regarding any expert findings or opinions, they must first be qualified by the court as an expert, based on their education, training, or experience (and then their testimony must deemed properly admissible, which is strictly a legal question). During voir dire, the forensic expert is presented to the court by the side that has called them to testify; they are asked questions regarding their qualifications in direct examination; they are then challenged regarding their qualifications under cross-examination by opposing counsel and the court. This is true whether one is testifying on behalf of the prosecution or the defense.

Now,it is a well known fact that judicial rulings regarding who is, and who is not, an admissible expert are generally biased in favor of the prosecution, as discussed in Moreno (2004):

"Judges routinely admit expert testimony offered by prosecutors, but frequently exclude expert testimony offered by the defense. A review of federal criminal court cases reveals that 92% of prosecution experts survive defense challenges while only 33% of defense experts survive challenges by federal prosecutors. A recent study of federal appellate criminal cases found that more than 95% of prosecutors’ experts are admitted at trial, while fewer than 8% of defense experts are allowed to testify. Why do judges consistently fail to scrutinize prosecution experts? Maybe it is the uniform. The most common prosecution expert witness is a police officer or a federal agent. In state and federal criminal trials, law enforcement experts are routinely permitted to testify to opinions and conclusions derived from their on-the-job experience and personal observations. Prosecutors rely on police officer experts most frequently in narcotics cases. In drug cases, law enforcement experts are often asked to interpret ambiguous words or phrases used by the defendant and/or his coconspirators. The purpose of, and problem with, this expert testimony is that it tells jurors precisely which inculpatory inferences they should draw from the factual evidence."

While this might not seem immediately relevant in the Kansas decision, we should pause to note that many of the forensic scientists working in that state are in fact employed directly by law enforcement agencies. In any case, Kansas House Bill No. 2057 provides absolute cover from the voir dire safeguard by fast-tracking the admission of state sponsored expert findings. Like a stack of blank arrest or search warrants that have pre-signed by a judge, the problem of pre-endorsing expertise assumes too much and would encourage the worst practices. It assumes unbiased competence, as well as proper levels of education and expertise, on the part of state employed forensic scientists.

The ability to confront forensic scientists about their qualifications has uncovered enough outright state sponsored fraud that it must be protected as an invaluable tool for justice - not discarded for the sake of expediency. Frankly, this level of confidence has not been earned by the current forensic science community. As found in Turvey (2003), when forensic fraud occurs it is generally on behalf of the state (85% of the time); and as the many crime lab scandals have taught us, notions of forensic competence are often misplaced in what is widely regarded as a biased and broken forensic science system (Edwards and Gotsonis, 2009). To be very clear, presuming that those employed by the prosecution are inherently credible further tips the balance of the courtroom against the defendant, and slaps the notion of fairness across the face.


Forensic science reports often contain language or findings that require explanation in order to be meaningful in a given case. This can include terms of art, or limitations of methodology, or opinions that may not be made perfectly clear in the report itself. Submitted and accepted without explanation, such reports can be extremely dangerous, and may even be abused. In the absence of a forensic scientist in court to explain the meaning of findings to judges and juries, the interpretation is left for attorneys to argue. Or worse, for prosecutors to craft and elicit from non-scientist witnesses, proving an improper veneer of authority. Anyone who argues against this point has not spent any time in court paying attention to how forensic findings are used against witnesses and in opening and closing statements. Misrepresenting findings, misstating them, and worse are quite frankly common place.

Given these issues, it hardly seems likely that Kansas House Bill No. 2057, or any similar legislation, should have been drafted at all. That it was put on paper and then passed Senate approval suggests a deep ignorance of forensic science related law and the current culture of problems in the forensic science community. It most certainly will result in challenges, and is likely to result in a multitude of overturned cases at appeal if trial judges abide. Ultimately, such a waste of the appellate court's time will cost far more than the resources that 2057 was allegedly intended to save.


Edwards, H. and Gotsonis, C. (2009) Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward, National Academies Press, Washington D.C.

Lefler, (2011) "Bill lets forensic experts report in writing, skip testifying," The Wichita Eagle, March 10.

Moreno, J. (2004) "What Happens When Dirty Harry Becomes an (Expert) Witness for the Prosecution?" Tulane Law Review, Vol. 79, November; pp.1–54.

Turvey, B. (2003) “Forensic Frauds: A Study of 42 Cases,” Journal of Behavioral Profiling, 4(1).

Turvey, B. and Petherick, W. (2010) "Cognitive Ethos of the Forensic Examiner," in Forensic Criminology, San Diego: Elsevier Science.

Crime Scene Analysis & Criminal Profiling Seminar

Forensic Solutions and the Academy of Behavioral Profiling are pleased to sponsor the following two day training event in conjunction with the Elgin Community College. College credit is available for ECC students.

This is a two (2) day session where students learn theory and practice through the structured examination of case study material. The first day will involve the theory and practice of an holistic approach to crime reconstruction. The second day will involve the theory and practice of crime scene analysis. Each day will culminate in group work with actual case material.

This workshop is open to the public, and is strongly recommended for students and professionals who are working or studying in areas related to:

• Criminology
• Criminal Investigation
• Criminal Justice
• Forensic Nursing
• Forensic Science
• Law Enforcement
• Legal studies
• Mental Health/ Counseling
• Psychology
• Sociology
• Women's studies
• Victimology


Elgin Community College
ATC Auditorium
1700 Spartan Dr.
Elgin, Illinois 60134

April 8-9, 2011; 9:00AM - 4:40PM

ECC Students: $30 USD
Non-ECC Students: $50 USD
Non-Student/ Public: $100 USD


ECC students can concurrently enroll in PSY220.101 for course credit. See, or contact Dr. Shawn Mikulay for more information.


Brent E. Turvey, MS

Shawn Mikulay, PhD

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Brent E. Turvey, MS
Forensic Scientist & Criminal Profiler

Brent E. Turvey holds a Bachelor of Science in Psychology, with an emphasis on Forensic Psychology, and an additional Bachelor of Science in History. He went on to receive his Masters of Science in Forensic Science after studying at the University of New Haven, in West Haven, Connecticut.

Since graduating in 1996, Brent has consulted with many government agencies, law enforcement agencies, and private attorneys in the United States, Australia, China, Canada, Barbados, Korea and Scotland on a range of rapes, homicides, and serial/ multiple rape/ death cases, as a forensic scientist and criminal profiler. This includes cases under investigation, as well as those going to trial. He has also been court qualified as a forensic expert in the areas of criminal profiling, forensic science, victimology, and crime reconstruction, providing expert examinations and testimony for the last 15 years.

He is the author of Criminal Profiling: An Introduction to Behavioral Evidence Analysis, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Ed. (1999, 2002, 2008, 2011); and co-author of Rape Investigation Handbook, 1st and 2nd Ed. (2004, 2011), Crime Reconstruction, 1st and 2nd Ed. (2006, 2011), and Forensic Victimology (2009) - all with Elsevier Science. For a complete list of titles, see

Brent is currently a full partner, Forensic Scientist, Criminal Profiler, and Instructor with Forensic Solutions, LLC, as well as an Adjunct Professor in the Department of Sociology and Justice Studies at Oklahoma City University. He is also the Secretary of the Academy of Behavioral Profiling, as well as a member of their board of directors.

Shawn Mikulay, PhD
Associate Professor of Psychology
Vice President, Academy of Behavioral Profiling

Shawn Mikulay received his BA, MA, and PhD in Psychology, and his MS in Industrial Management from Northern Illinois University. His published research is concentrated in the ara of employee deviance. He is currently an Associate Professor in the Psychology Department at Elgin Community College, and teaches courses in experimental, developmental, social, introductory, and forensic psychology, as well as human sexuality.

He is currently serving as the Vice President of the Academy of Behavioral Profiling.


Those interested in registering for this workshop may pay by check, money order, Visa, MC, or Discover.

Check or Money Order
Make all checks or international money orders payable to Forensic Solutions, LLC in US Dollars. Also, provide your name, employment/ student information, and contact information including phone and email so that we can contact you and send updates.

Mail to:
ECC Seminar c/o
Forensic Solutions, LLC
P.O. Box 2175
Sitka, Alaska 99835

Visa/ MC
Click on the appropriate link below.


Non-ECC Students: $50 USD


Non-Student/ Public: $100 USD


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